

DAILY CONFEDERATE.

A. M. GORMAN & Co., Proprs.	
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For the Confederate.

Gen. Bragg's Report of the Battle of Murfreesboro'.

As the report of this distinguished son of North Carolina, of the battle of Murfreesboro', has never appeared in the columns of a North Carolina paper, I transmit you a copy which I trust you will publish in the *Confederate*. Gen. Bragg's career as an officer has been most valiantly and ruthlessly assailed by his enemies. Reason, however, is at last beginning to dawn upon the public mind, and as it ushers the place of passion and prejudice, the obloquy of his untiring assailants have sought to heap upon his reputation, rather tends to brighten than to diminish the lustre of his heroic achievements and eminently useful services in behalf of Southern independence. I earnestly commend the report of the battle of Murfreesboro' to the attentive perusal of every North Carolinian.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

Tullahoma, 23d Feby, 1862.

Six.—On the 26th of December last the enemy advanced in force from Nashville to attack us at Murfreesboro'. It had been well ascertained that his strength was over 60,000 effective men. Before night on that day the object of the movement was developed, by our dispositions in front, and orders were given for the necessary concentration of our forces, then distributed as follows:

Polk's corps and three brigades of Breckinridge's division, Hardee's corps at Murfreesboro'. The balance of Hardee's corps near Eagleville, about 20 miles west of Murfreesboro'. McCown's division (which with Stevenson's division remained constituent Smith's corps) at Ryderville, 12 miles east of Murfreesboro'. The three cavalry brigades of Wheeler, Wharton and Pegram occupying the entire front of our infantry and covering all approaches to within ten miles of Nashville. Buford's small cavalry brigade of about 600 at McMinnville. The brigades of Forrest and Morgan, about 6000 effective cavalry, were absent on special service in West Tennessee and Northern Kentucky, as will be more fully noticed hereafter. Jackson's small infantry brigade was in rear, guarding the railroad from Bridgeport, Alabama, to the mountains. On Sunday, the 28th, our main force of infantry and artillery was concentrated in front of Murfreesboro', whilst the cavalry supported by three brigades of infantry and three batteries of artillery impeded the advance of the enemy by constant skirmishing, and sudden unexpected attacks. To the skillful manner in which the cavalry, thus ably supported, was handled, and to the exceeding gallantry of its officers and men, must be attributed to the four days' time consumed by the enemy in reaching the battle-field, a distance of only 20 miles from his encampment, over fine Macadamized roads.

Fully aware of the greatly superior numbers of the enemy, as indicated in my early reports from this quarter, it was our policy to await attack. The position was selected and line developed with this intention. Owing to the convergence upon our depot of so many fine roads, by which the enemy could approach, as will appear from the enclosed map marked "I," we were confined in our selection to a line near enough the point of junction to enable us to successfully cover them all, until the real point of attack should be developed.

On Monday, the 29th, it was reported that heavy columns moved on both the direct road from Livermore and on the one leading into the Lebanon road by way of Jefferson. But on Tuesday, the 30th, it was ascertained that the Jefferson pike was abandoned by a counter-march, and the whole forces of the enemy were concentrated on and near the road on the west of Stone's river. The dispositions made for the unequal contest will appear from the enclosed map marked "2," and the copy of memoranda to General and staff officers marked "3."

These arrangements were all completed before the enemy crossed Stewart's creek, nine miles out, and the infantry brigades were at once called in; and the cavalry was ordered to fall back more rapidly, having most gallantly discharged its duty and fully accomplished the objects desired. Late on Monday, it became apparent the enemy was extending to his right, to flank us on the left. McCown's division in reserve was promptly thrown to that flank, and added to the command of Lt. Gen. Polk. The enemy, not meeting our expectations of making an attack on Tuesday, which was consumed in artillery firing and heavy skirmishing, with the exception of a dash late in the evening on the left of Wharton's division, which was repulsed and severely punished, it was determined to assail him on Wednesday morning, the 31st.

For this purpose, Cleburne's Division, Hardee's corps, was moved from the second line on the right to the corps holding position on the left, and Lt. Gen. Hardee was ordered to that point, and assigned to the command of that and McCown's Division. This disposition, the result of necessity, left me no reserve; but Breckinridge's command on the right, now not threatened, was regarded as a source of supply for any reinforcements absolutely necessary to other parts of the field. Stone's river at its then low stage, was formidable at almost any point for infantry, and at short intervals perfectly practicable for artillery.

These dispositions completed, Lieutenant General Hardee was ordered to assail the enemy at daylight on Wednesday, the 31st, the attack to be taken up by General Polk's command in succession to the right flank; the move to be made by a constant wheel to the right flank on Polk's right flank as a pivot. The object being to force the enemy back on Stone's river, and if practicable, by the aid of cavalry, cut him off from his base of operations and supplies by the Nashville pike.

The lines were now bivouacked at a distance, in places, of not more than 500 yards, the camp fires of the two being within distinct view. Wharton's cavalry brigade had been held on our left to watch and check the movements of the enemy in that direction, and to prevent his cavalry from gaining the railroad in our rear, the preservation of which was of vital importance. In this he was aided by Brigadier General A. Buford, who had a small command of 600 new cavalry. The duty was most ably, gallantly and successfully performed.

On Monday night, Brigadier General Wheeler proceeded with his cavalry brigade and one regiment from Pegram's, as ordered, to

THE DAILY CONFEDERATE.

OLD SERIES, VOL. V.

RALEIGH, N. C. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1864.

VOL. I—No. 235.

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Upon the receipt of the price we will forward this book to any address in the Confederacy, postpaid.

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ATTENTION REFUGEES!!

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The tract of land consists of 216 acres, and is well improved, having a dwelling with seven rooms, six fire-places; and another dwelling with three rooms, two fire-places, an office with two rooms, fire place to each; 10 Negro Cabins, 2 Smoke houses, a meat Storehouse 20 by 52 feet, a Tobacco house 16 by 65 feet, and a stable 16 by 24 feet. Two Tobacco Patches, Mills, Sheds, and all necessary fixtures, and room to work 75 to 100 hands. Steam House, Box Shop, Work-Shop 28 by 52 feet, one House 26 by 50 feet, two stores; a Blacksmith Shop, two Forges, one large Granary 34 by 45 feet, Well, Stables for twenty head of Horses, two good Corn-Cobs, Carriage-House, two Orchards of the best selection of Fruits; and a never-failing Well of Splendid Water in the yard.

Also, one Lot of 8 acres, with a good dwelling with four rooms, two fire-places, and all necessary out houses, and good well of Water.

One other five acre Lot, with a good dwelling, three rooms and one fire-place, out houses and a splendid well of Water. Most all the improvements have been put up in the last 6 or 10 years. All the landings and can be cut up to suit purchasers.

It is not necessary to say anything further, as the place will recommend itself upon examination.

We also have a large lot of Manufactured and Leaf Tabacco, from medium to finest grades, and a lot of Tobacco Twine.

All the above named property we will sell for Confederate money, or a part in Negroes. This property is in a section of country where there is a convenient port of good River Bottom Land, which can be rented, or for a second to reinforce or act as a reserve to Lt. Gen. Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy crossing Stone river, in heavy force, in his immediate front, and on receiving the second order, he informed me that they had already crossed in heavy force, and were advancing to attack his lines. He was immediately ordered not to attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy's infantry was advancing on the Lebanon road, about five miles in Breckinridge's division, the front. Brig. Gen. Pegram, who had been sent to that road, to cover the flank of the infantry with his cavalry brigade, saw two regiments detached with White and Wharton, and ordered to attack. He had crossed Stone's river, and had advanced forward immediately to develop any such movement. The order for the two brigades from Breckinridge, however, countermanded, whilst di positions were made, at his request, to reinforce him. Before they could be carried out the movement ordered disclosed the fact that no force had crossed Stone's river, that the only enemy in our immediate front then was a small body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon road. These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field, which with proper precaution could not have existed, withheld from active operations these two brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had re-established his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions.

October 26th, 1864.—det.

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Oct 27-nd 1864 Tally-Ho, Granville Co., N. C.

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Will be rented out at Hillsboro', Nash County, to the highest bidder, on the 12th November. Two Farns, on each of which 6 or 8 hands can be worked to advantage. There is on each place a good Overseed's house, and Negro Cabins.

W. H. & W. F. ROWLAND.

October 27, 1864.—det.

Mrs. MILLER continues to accommodate

Boarders, by the day, week or month.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

OFFICIAL.

TRUSTEES.

CONFEDERATE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Richmond, October 12, 1864.

NO TAXABLE BONDS, FIVE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS.—Sale—contingent. Numerous applications having been made for bonds at the established price of one hundred and thirty-five dollars and interest, under circumstances that entitle the government to make a considerable reduction in the price. Agents are directed to continue the sale at the above price further notice.

Agents for the sale of these bonds are instructed to act in accordance with this order; and the action of disbursing officers of the government is particularly called to it.

G. A. TRENHOLM,
Secy. of the Treas.

FOR SALE.

CONSCRIPT OFFICE.

RALEIGH, N. C., Oct. 22nd, 1864.

CIRCUIT LAR., No. 56.

THE ATTENTION OF INSPECTORS of

Enrollment and Enrolling Officers is hereby called to General Order No. 42, A. & L. G. C. current series.

All men turned over under this order will be forwarded to Camps of Instruction without delay.

II. Any delay in furnishing the required lists will be severely reprimanded.

III. Special attention is directed to Par IV, General Order, No. 42, A. & L. G. O., current series.

By order J. R. McLEARN.

Acting Comt. of Conscription, N. C.

E. J. HARDIN,
Adjutant.

ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR'S OFFICE.

Richmond, Oct. 20, 1864.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 82.

THE Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance will without delay, take measures to place the field ordnance in the most convenient position, (including contractors and their employees,) of the classes specified in General Orders No. 77, A. and L. G. O. (current series). To this end he will direct the several officers in charge of arsenals, workshops, depots, &c., to turn over to the most reliable enrolling officer, the property of the arsenals, workshops, &c., in his command, including contractors and their employees, such proportion of the implements, instruments and stores as will be required for the execution of this order, and to forward to the Bureau of Ordnance the names of the contractors and employees under their charge, in the aggregate one fifth of the whole number in the class above referred to, as will constitute in the aggregate one fifth of the whole number in the said class, according to returns in his office Sept. 30, 1864. Duplicate of such list will be sent to the Generals of Reserves of the Army and the Adjutant General of the Navy. Three lists are allowed for the execution of this order after its reception at any post or station of the ordnance department.

II. The chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, will turn over in like manner, similar lists, one-fifth of all the men of the classes specified in General Order No. 77, to be employed in the mining of nitre, and to be appointed to the various offices of each of the above bureaus to whom the service of each of the above bureaus is due. Three lists are allowed for the execution of this order after its reception at any post or station of the ordnance department.

III. The list of persons directed in the foregoing sections to be turned over to the enrolling officer, will be prepared at once, on the reception of this order, and will be furnished to the said officers within three days, as above prescribed, by a various officers of each of the above bureaus having charge under their charge, and every assistance will be rendered by the latter to the enrolling officers to carry out the intention of this order.

IV. So much of General Orders No. 77, as relates to men employed in the two bureaus named above, is hereby suspended, and the foregoing order will stand in view of all requirements under the former.

By order, S. COOPER,
A. and L. G. O.

Franklin's, Monday, 24th of October.

Barney Jones, Tuesday, 25th

Lashley Roads, Wednesday, 26th

The Confederate.

D. R. MURRAY, A. M. GORMAN, EDITORS.

All letters on business of the Office, to be directed to A. M. GORMAN & CO., NEW YORK.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1864.

In the late meeting at Augusta, the Governors adopted the following resolution, as a portion of their programme for the giving "encouragement to our brave soldiers in the field and to strengthen the Confederate authorities in the pursuit of this desirable end:—

And, whereas, the public enemy having proclaimed the freedom of our slaves, are forcing into their armies the able-bodied portion thereof, the more effectually to wage their cruel and bloody war against us: Therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the true policy and obvious duty of all slave owners timely to remove their slaves from the line of the enemy's approach, and especially those able to bear arms; and when they shall fail to do so, that it should be made the duty of the proper authorities to enforce the performance of this duty and to give to such owners all necessary assistance as far as practicable.

Resolved, That the cause of the enemy in appropriating our slaves who happen to fall into their hands to purposes of war, seems to justify a change of policy on our part; and, whilst owners of slaves under the circumstances should freely yield them to their country, we recommend to our authorities, under proper regulations, to appropriate such part of them to the public service as may be required.

It is a lamentable misfortune that the policy of hastening their slaves out the reach of the enemy had not occurred to the owners of this species of property in the very beginning of the war. It was not hidden from many of us, who did what we could to urge it in the section where we resided. The writer of this made it the subject of an earnest appeal to several of the citizens of Georgia, when the attack there was anticipated. It was in the power of slave owners easily to have removed their property from the enemy's reach. They had every where ample warning of his approach, and they had no cause to hope that it would share any other fate than that which has befallen it. They could have found, in secure places, land for sale, land for rent, land unopened capable of improvement. They could have found employment in many avocations for their slaves, and could have hired them to advantage. Had this policy been commenced at an early period of the war, the exaggerated but apparently well-founded apprehensions of too heavy a call on the labor of the country, would not have arisen, our armies could always have been more regularly reinforced, and by this time there would have been in the various public employments, disciplined slaves, competent and abundant, so that the ranks of the army might always have more nearly approximated those of the foe.

The President's Proclamation.

In another column will be found the Proclamation of President Davis; appointing the 16th of November next as a day of humiliation and prayer by the people of the Confederacy. We are always glad to see these calls to prayer by our Chief Magistrate; recognizing our dependence on God and a righteous faith in the justness of our cause, and that He will vouchsafe His favor and aid if we call on Him. But for the faith of the Christian, we should have despaired of our success long ago. But in our struggle for independence, we are also contending for the faith of our fathers. In resisting the assaults of our enemy upon civil liberty, we are also resisting the religious wrongs and outrages they have committed upon the very altars of our God. We may therefore confidently call upon Jehovah to give us the victory. Never doubting the self-sustaining power of truth, we proclaim and assert our rights against the assumptions of those who have risen up to destroy us.

Confiding in the justice of a righteous cause, with an ardor never to abate till we have reached the desired end in our religious as well as civil faith, let us imitate the heroic example of those upholders of the Christian Cross, who in every age have withstood the fierce assaults of its enemies. Planted in the faith of the former, the latter blessing of Heaven is within our reach. Then let us press steadily on, "for 'tis Godlike to be free."

We understand that our friend Brig. Gen. Grimes was slightly wounded in the last fight in the Valley, having been struck by a spent ball. He made a very narrow escape with his life. Two horses were killed under him; the shell in one instance striking the animal within an inch or two of Gen. G.'s person. All were in fine spirits, and another forward move was resolved on. About 8 p. m. we advanced and drove the enemy a short distance. They made several attempts to advance in front of our division, but were handily repulsed. I breasted more freely, for night was coming on. But soon unmistakable signs of defeat appeared on our left, where Gen. Gordon was stationed. Men began to run to the rear, and soon our brigade was called for to take position to sustain Kershaw. The line broke and we were compelled to return to a stone fence, and here we held them in check; we again retired a short distance and held them in check against a murderous fire; and having maintained our position about an hour, Kershaw gave way at the critical moment—Gordon having given way some time before. And now commenced one of the most disgraceful scenes of the war—a general stampede. It was impossible to rally the men, for they were determined not to fight nor to be captured.

Gen. Cox had his horse shot under him, and a spent ball struck him on the thigh. General Bemaur was fatally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The yankee cavalry in small force, came down and stopped the train, took nearly all our artillery and recaptured nearly all they had lost, and many ambulances and wagons, with the wounded. Could fifty men have been rallied, we could have retained the substantial fruits of our victory; but Gen. Early himself could do nothing with the men.

In making these remarks we do not mean to discriminate against other commanders, but simply to pay a deserved commendation to two officers who have well earned the gratitude of the nation.

P. S.—Since writing the above, we have been put in possession of facts, through a friend in this city, which may be regarded as authentic, which bespeak in mournful terms the disappointment of our officers at the sad termination of the affair of the 19th in the Valley. The escape of General Cox on that day was also a very narrow one. He too was struck by a ball, his clothes perforated and his horse killed under him.

The suggestion from the Governors comes late, but "that it is the true and obvious policy and duty of all slave owners timely to remove their slaves from the line of the enemy's approach," cannot admit of a question; and the interest of the public is so much involved, that there can be little doubt "that when they fail to do so, that it should be made the duty of the proper authorities to enforce the performance of this duty, and to give such owners all necessary assistance as far as practicable."

Viewed in the light of lost labor and lost capital alone, the nation has sustained a deplorable diminution of strength, by the unwise policy of the past; and when to this is added the contribution of actual material of war which

it has made to the enemy, it seems almost incredible that such policy should at all have been tolerated.

This subject should engage the prompt attention of Congress and the Legislatures. If this evil be corrected, the assembly of the Governors at Augusta will have accomplished an important benefit to the nation.

We notice the leader of the *Conservative* on yesterday, with regret. That paper seems to keep up a determined spirit of partizanship. It follows in the wake of those it has been wont to condemn, and singles out a few political opponents, whom it may abuse for dereliction: "We are no defenders of any man who shirks his duty in this struggle; nor can we perceive the advantage of this continual recurrence to the past, for the purpose of fanning the coals of party prejudice. Nor is it just or true to accuse the *original secessionists*, either directly or by implication, of failing in their duty as a class. Let the records of this war be published, and it will be seen that they form the large majority of those in the service. We mean by this, that those who led in the secession movement, constitute either in their own persons, where they are within the age, or in the persons of their children where they are past the age—as contrasted with those who led in the opposition—a decided majority of those in the service."

But why pursue such an enquiry now?—The State of North Carolina seceded—she joined the Confederate States—she is invaded—she is engaged in the war. The obligation to bear a hand is equal on all her sons, according as they can be most serviceable. If it be fault to remain out when one ought to go in, it is no less a fault to stir animosities and weaken the cause, in order to gratify political spite or serve party ends. Nor is it worth while to follow the argument whether the militia officers should be retained for home service, or sent to the army. The *status* is materially changed since the question first occurred, and especially since the meeting of the "consultative council" of Governors.—The army is reinforced—the country is content with the matter as it stands at the present. Perhaps it may become necessary to remain out when one ought to go in. It is not less a fault to stir animosities and weaken the cause, in order to gratify political spite or serve party ends. 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